HELD Sample Clauses

HELD. Red Steer shall issue two separate checks for the penalty payment: (a) one check made payable to OEHHA in the amount of $2,250.00 representing 75% of the total penalty; and (b) one check to “The Chanler Group in Trust for Anthony E.. Held” in the amount of $750.00 representing 25% of the total penalty. Two separate 1099s shall be issued for the above payments. The checks and 1099s shall be delivered to the addresses listed in Section 3.3 below.
HELD. Motion allowed. The motion for discontinuance required an absence of prejudice to the class. Any requirement of good faith or reasonable grounds was relevant to the inquiry into the prejudicial effect on the interests of class members. There was no need to give weight to the interests of the defendants. The Teskey defendants did not have standing to oppose the motion for discontinuance, as they were not parties to the actions that the plaintiffs sought to discontinue. The commencement of the composite action did not improve their position with respect to actions to which they were not a party. Any actual or presumed prejudice to the Teskey defendants was not relevant to the determination related to discontinuance, as the purpose of s. 29 of the Class Proceedings Act was to protect the interests of class members. Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited: Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, s. 12, s. 29, s. 29(1), s. 35 Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.19, Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23.01(1)(a), Rule 23.01(1)(b) Technical Standards and Safety Act, 2000, S.0 2000, c. 16, Counsel: Harvin Pitch and Theodore P. Charney, for the Plaintiffs. John A. Campion, Antonio Di Domenico and Ian Gold, for 2094528 Ontario Inc., HGT Holdings Ltd., Teskey Construction Co. Ltd., and Teskey Concrete Co. Ltd. Lisa D. La Horey, for the Technical Safety Standards Authority. Ward Branch, for 1452049 Ontario Ltd. Cheryl Woodin, for the City of Toronto. Robert Potts and Mirilyn Sharp, for Sunrise Propane Energy Group Inc,, 1367229 Ontario Inc., 1186728 Ontario Ltd., Valery Belahov, Shay (Sean) Ben-Moshe, Leonid Belahov and Arie Belahov. Paul Belanger, for 1369630 Ontario Inc. Bill Evans, for Scottish and York Insurance Co. DIRECTIONS
HELD. (i) To give the expression "industrial relations matters" so wide an interpretation as to include breach of contract, wrongful dismissal or claims which could be tried by the surbodinate or local courts would lead to absurdity.
HELD. Appeal dismissed. The province's officials were bound to consult any resources necessary to make a properly informed decision on First Coal's amendment applications. These resources were not limited to First Coal's experts. The officials were bound to consider the treaty rights of the First Nations. The province failed to provide meaningful consultation to the First Nations in failing to consider the impact of First Coal's proposed future operations, not just the proposed sampling. Given that the First Nations historically hunted caribou, First Coal's proposed operations had the potential to adversely affect their treaty hunting rights. The judge did not err in considering the specific location and species of the First Nations' hunting practices. The province failed to address how the First Nations' concerns had been addressed by First Coal's plan to mitigate harm. It erred in proceeding on the premise that the exploration projects should proceed and that some sort of mitigation plan would suffice. It erred in treating the First Nations' right to hunt as inferior to the Crown's right to take up land for mining. Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited: Constitution Act, 1982, R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 44, Schedule B, s. 35, s. 35(1) Environmental Assessment Act, SBC 2002, CHAPTER 43, s. 8 Judicial Review Procedure Act, RSBC 1996, CHAPTER 241, s. 5, s. 6 Mines Act, RSBC 1996, CHAPTER 293, Reviewable Project Regulations, B.C. Reg. 370/2002, Part 3 -- Mine Projects Appeal From: On appeal from: Supreme Court of British Columbia, March 19, 2010, (West Moberly First Nations v. British Columbia (Chief Inspector of Mines), 2010 BCSC 359, Victoria Docket No. 09-4823). Counsel: Counsel for the Appellant, Province of British Columbia: K.J. Phillips and E.K. Christie. Counsel for the Respondent, First Coal Corporation: K.E. Clark and R. Robertson. Counsel for the Respondent, West Moberly First Nations: C.G.
HELD. Action allowed. The agreement was void ab initio and the buyers were entitled to rescind the contract. The deposit was ordered to be released forthwith. The inaccurate statement as to the property's acreage was a substantial overstatement which, having regard to the buyers' intention for the property, was such as to entitle them to rescind the contract. Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited: Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 14, 14.05(3)(d), 14.05(3)(h). Counsel: David M. Sanders, for the applicants. Alan D. Direnfeld, for the defendants ¶ 1 SHEPPARD J.:— The parties entered into a standard form Toronto Real Estate Board agreement of purchase and sale for a residential property located in Vaughan. The agreement was dated April 3rd, 2000. The purchase price was $1,110,000 with a deposit of $100,000. Requisition date was May 15th, 2000. Closing date was June 1st, 2000.
HELD. First question is if the distress is lien on chattel under a statute. It is. The municipality’s lien arose when it took possession of the chattel by distress. Second, is the lien part of the exception in the 4(1)(a) of the PPSA. The exception deals with competition between a lien and an unperfected security interest only. Therefore, provisions of the PPSA do not apply here. If they did, the lien would have priority over perfected security interests. The legislature could not have intended otherwise. Note: This is broad reading of s.400(2) and not a wholly satisfactory answer to the competition problem. There is ongoing debate about how to handle this (no priority for the Crown, special priority rules, etc).
HELD. Action dismissed; counterclaim allowed. The document signed in June 1989 was a valid agreement between the parties, and the evidence suggested that it included a finished basement. The upper limit of $140,000 as a price was binding on the plaintiff. Since the price was set by contract, the plaintiff could not rely on the doctrine of quantum meruit. Counsel: Richard A. Pharand, for the plaintiff.
HELD.  Lease enforced at equity, even though no formal lease agreement. o As based around whether agreement is enforceable, is on the facts. o Must constitute a contract under CL principles: rent, name, durationIf tenant has a lease agreement, has same terms in equity as if granted, and if both parties admit specific performance can be given as relief, then a lease.  Landlord can only re-enter if breach of covenant and thus tenant cannot claim distress when rent covenant called upon, just because not in writing.
HELD. Application dismissed with costs. Application for production of the files also dismissed with costs. The plaintiff failed to establish there was no genuine issue for trial. The plaintiff was seeking summary judgment relating to work performed for Home Depot in the face of serious and substantial evidence by Holman that while performing those services he received secret commissions, created self-admitted false documentation, failed to disclose to his employer that he directed work to others, violated his exclusivity commitment, and arranged for his wife to render billings in connection with such work. There was both direct and circumstantial evidence raising genuine issues for trial regarding the commission claims. There was an inextricable intertwining of the factual matrix between the claims upon which summary judgment was sought and those relating to the set-off. The defence of set-off was not so weak as to refuse to justify postponing payments to the plaintiff. It would be wholly inequitable and unreasonable in the circumstances to permit the plaintiff to receive judgment for a portion of his claims when there remained genuine issues required to be determined by the trial judge. As for the production application, there was no compelling fairness or public policy reason given by counsel to support a finding of waiver of privilege. The plaintiff was awarded $11,500 in costs. Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited: Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 20.04
HELD. One appeal was allowed and two were dismissed. The insurer of the company vehicle was responsible for the payment of the Statutory Accident Benefits. Changes to the wording of section 66 of the Insurance Act did not change the approach to be taken in determining the entitlement to Statutory Accident Benefits under the Regulation or the obligation to pay those benefits under the Insurance Act. Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited: Bill 59, s. 66(1). Bill 164. Insurance Act, ss. 66, 66(1), 268, 268(5). Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, ss. 2, 3(1), 91(4).